Financing U.S. debt: Is there enough money in the world – and at what cost? by Kitchen, John & Chinn, Menzie
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Financing U.S. debt: Is there enough
money in the world – and at what cost?
John Kitchen and Menzie Chinn
U.S. Department of the Treasury, La Follette School of Public
Affairs; and Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin
12. August 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24736/
MPRA Paper No. 24736, posted 3. September 2010 14:13 UTC
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financing U.S. Debt: 
  
Is There Enough Money in the World – and At What Cost? 
 
 
 
 
 
John Kitchen* 
 
and 
 
Menzie Chinn** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 12, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views contained herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those 
of the institutions with which the authors are associated. 
 
* U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC 20220.  Email:  john.kitchen@do.treas.gov  
 
** Robert M. La Follette School of Public Affairs; and Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 
Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706-1393. Email: mchinn@lafollette.wisc.edu  
 
  ii
ABSTRACT: 
 
This paper examines the potential role for foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities 
and the associated implications for Treasury security interest rates, international portfolio 
allocations, net international income flows, and the U.S. net international debt position, using a 
baseline outlook of current and projected U.S. budget deficits and growing debt.  The analysis 
applies empirical results regarding the role of U.S. structural budget deficits and foreign official 
holdings of U.S. Treasuries in determining Treasury security interest rates.  Although initial 
review of information suggests that the world portfolio could potentially accommodate financing 
requirements over the intermediate horizon, substantial uncertainty remains about the 
relationships among foreign official holdings, exchange rates, and trade; the potential effects of 
“crowding out” in the international portfolio; and how and whether world portfolio allocations 
would adjust to accommodate higher shares of U.S. assets. 
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Financing U.S. Debt:  
Is There Enough Money in the World – and At What Cost? 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States and many other advanced economies have long faced fundamental budget and external 
imbalances that, under current policy configurations, are unsustainable in the long run.  Recent sovereign 
debt concerns in Europe, while not directly comparable in nature to those facing the United States, have 
heightened the attention devoted to public finances in the U.S.  In the short to medium run, the key 
relationships involve the nexus between the rising domestic and international financing costs of debt 
service, and the interactions with the current account deficit and net international debt position.  The 
international funding sources for U.S. government debt are of particular importance, and such funding has 
in recent history depended heavily on the behavior of foreign official holdings.  Analysis of prospects for 
financing the budget deficit is complicated because foreign official holdings, the foreign exchange value 
of the dollar, and the U.S. trade deficit and net international debt position are all intertwined.  In this 
paper, we assess the importance of foreign financial flows – and notably foreign official holdings of U.S. 
Treasury securities – not only for financing the U.S. net export and current account deficits but also for 
funding U.S. government borrowing and affecting U.S. long-term Treasury interest rates. 
 
This work adopts and extends the framework used by Kitchen (2007).  Using consensus projections for 
the U.S economy, net exports, and exchange rates, that analysis found that the outlook for the U.S. 
international debt position and net international income flows was generally less dire and more 
sustainable than had been typically assumed given the persistence of U.S. current account imbalances.  
With the drastic change in economic prospects in recent years, it is clear that a re-examination is in order. 
The financial crisis and the recession – and policy actions to mitigate both – have resulted in large 
increases in the U.S. Federal budget deficit and the publicly held debt, with an outlook for continued 
deficits and growing debt.  The deterioration in public finances has then brought an immediacy to the 
previously existing concerns regarding the sustainability of the nation’s public finances (Auerbach and 
Gale (2009)).  The situation is further complicated by the large share of U.S. Treasury debt held by 
foreigners. 
 
Within the setting of current and projected budget deficits and debt, this paper examines the role of 
foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities and the implications for Treasury security interest 
rates and relative international portfolio allocations.  The analysis presents estimates of the impact  of 
U.S. structural budget deficits and foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasuries on U.S. Treasury security 
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interest rates.  Using that information and baseline economic and budget projections, the implications of 
alternative assumptions about the projected behavior of foreign official holdings are examined for:  (1) 
the implied/required international portfolio adjustments for foreign holdings of U.S. international debt 
and other assets;  (2) the projected U.S. international net debt position and net income flows, including the 
role of U.S. government payments on foreign official holdings; (3) the effects of budget deficits and 
foreign official holdings on U.S. Treasury interest rates;  (4) the potential feedback effects to and from 
interest rates to the U.S. budget deficit; and (5) a scenario with higher growth in Federal Reserve holdings 
of Treasuries and partial monetization of the debt.  The prospects for crowding out of international capital 
flows – under the assumption of a growing international portfolio share for foreign official holdings – are 
also addressed.  Questions remain regarding the potential trade-offs the United States could face under 
these relationships and whether, under the current fiscal policy outlook, the high level of foreign official 
holdings implied by the interest rate projections of most current public and private economic forecasts 
could ever be considered reasonable or attainable.  The results therefore provide information regarding 
Meltzer’s (2009) claim that “There isn’t going to be enough money in the world in the years to come to 
finance the U.S. budget deficits.” 
 
The results and scenarios presented in this paper are not “forecasts” per se, but rather projections that 
illustrate some fundamental relationships for the U.S. fiscal outlook in an international setting, and 
specifically the role of international financial flows and portfolio adjustments.  The analysis is intended to 
provide a baseline case and alternative scenarios that are descriptive of the relationships involved, and to 
aid in better understanding those relationships and the implications for the U.S. fiscal outlook.  Further, 
the analysis doesn’t address issues or questions associated with varying views of short-run policy or 
cyclical behavior, but looks ahead to the relationships and pressures that would occur at an intermediate 
horizon beyond those short-run transitions. 
 
Section 2 provides a brief review of some prior research and literature, providing background for the 
analysis of the paper.   Section 3 presents data and information on U.S. government debt and the base 
outlook as projected by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).  Section 4 examines an empirical 
specification and estimation results for U.S. Treasury interest rates and the role of budget deficits and 
foreign official holdings of Treasuries.  Section 5 presents the base case projections, including an explicit 
accounting for the large change in foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities (and other implied 
foreign portfolio allocations) required to meet the base case economic assumptions for interest rates.  The 
resulting outlook under the base case for the U.S. international debt position, net international income 
flows, and U.S. government payments to foreign holders of Treasury securities is also presented.  Section 
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6 examines two alternative scenarios to the base case:  the first alternative considers how the projected 
outlook would change if foreign official holdings of Treasuries were fixed as a percent of U.S. GDP (a 
declining share of total Treasury securities outstanding); the second alternative presents the effects on the 
projections from assuming the Federal Reserve (Fed) implements a sustained increase in the rate of 
growth for its holdings of U.S. Treasury securities (including assumed pass-through to inflation, nominal 
interest rates, and the exchange value of the dollar from such a partial monetization of the debt).  Section 
7 provides closing discussion. 
 
2.  SOME BACKGROUND AND SELECTED LITERATURE 
 
Questions about the sustainability of the U.S. current account and the outlook for U.S. international debt 
have received growing interest in recent years; the recent experience with and outlook for higher U.S. 
budget deficits and debt have raised further questions regarding the international implications.  The 
theoretical and empirical literature examining the relationships among budget deficits, international trade, 
current account sustainability, and the outlook for U.S. international debt and international net income 
flows is large.1  The traditional literature ascribes a fairly direct role between the budget balance and the 
current account balance.  Increases in government spending or reductions in taxes lead to increased 
aggregate demand, some of which spills over into increased imports.  Fiscal shocks of this nature then 
induce a positive correlation between budget deficits and current account deficits – with international 
financial flows helping to fund domestic investment, in contrast to a prior view that budget deficits would 
“crowd out” investment.  This “twin deficits” view dominated policy analysis during the 1980s, when tax 
rates were sharply reduced under the Reagan Administration and the exchange value of the dollar 
increased; empirical evidence appeared to buttress this view (Feldstein (1986)).2  The improvement in the 
trade balance as the budget deficit shrank also provided additional confirmation of the twin deficits view. 
 
This approach fell out of favor during the 1990s as public finances improved throughout the decade yet 
the current account deteriorated.  This episode highlighted the fact that alternative multiple shocks – 
either private demand, monetary, or supply side – can reverse the implied correlation.  Various 
explanations were forwarded.  The most prominent ones ascribe the enhanced growth prospects for the 
United States, as information and communication technologies raised productivity growth (e.g., Pakko 
(1999)).  In this intertemporal approach, in the presence of an upward revision in permanent income, 
                                                 
1 The theoretical literature linking budget deficits and trade balances, and stocks of government debt include the 
portfolio balance models of Kouri (1976) and Branson and Henderson (1985).  Recent treatments of the portfolio 
balance model have not explicitly modeled government, as opposed to private, assets. See for instance Blanchard, 
Giavazzi and Sa (2005). 
2 The “twin deficits” view is a straightforward application of the Mundell-Fleming model of the open economy. 
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running larger current account deficits would help smooth consumption.  Engel and Rogers (2009) have 
shown that the U.S. current account deficits throughout the 1990s and 2000s were consistent with 
expectations of future growth.  During the early- to mid-2000s, however, interest in the “twin deficits” 
hypothesis re-emerged as both budget and current account deficits widened (Chinn (2005)).   
 
In recent years questions concerning the “sustainability” of the U.S. current account deficit and the U.S. 
international debt position more generally have received much attention.  Mann (1999), Roubini and 
Setser (2004), Cline (2005), Higgins, Klitgaard, and Tille (2005), Eichengreen (2006), and Kitchen 
(2007) are among those who have examined the challenging outlook for U.S. international trade and 
financial imbalances, and the varying views as to whether the outlook is sustainable or manageable.  In 
this paper, we focus on particular aspects of the relationship between budget deficits and the current 
account.  Specifically, we examine the role of changes in foreign official holdings – one part of the 
international financial asset portfolio – as a key international financial flow for funding U.S. budget 
deficits (given the outlook for the U.S. fiscal imbalance and growing debt), and against the backdrop of 
the outlook for continued U.S. international imbalances.  A related question that arises is the potential for 
“crowding out” to occur within the international portfolio flows if a greater share is devoted to U.S. 
Treasuries.  Several other researchers have conducted research on issues similar to those addressed here, 
notably Bergsten(2009), Cline (2009), and Mann (2009).  Mann (2009) and Bertaut, Kamin, and Thomas 
(2009) examine the world financial asset portfolio and the question of available international funding to 
meet prospective U.S. international imbalances; we discuss their findings in more detail further below.3  
The roles of alternative sources of funding for U.S. budget deficits – international and domestic – for the 
determination of U.S. interest rates are also key issues in this analysis and will also be discussed further 
below. 
 
                                                 
3 Ideally, one would want to use a portfolio balance model based on asset stocks to determine the impact of budget 
deficits on interest rates, exchange rates, and current account balances.  Unfortunately, the empirical literature on 
estimating these relationships is largely unsuccessful. 
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3.  U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT:  HISTORICAL DATA, TRENDS, AND THE BASE OUTLOOK 
 
This section provides background information and historical data on publicly-held U.S. government debt, 
including Treasury debt securities in particular, but also for U.S. agency and government sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs).  Information is also provided on who holds the debt, including distinguishing between 
domestic and foreign owners, as well as private and official.  The assumptions used in the analysis 
regarding GSE debt holdings are addressed.  The base case outlook for the analysis – economic and 
budget projections from CBO’s baseline and President’s budget projections – is presented and discussed.4  
 
3.1.  Treasury debt and foreign official holdings 
 
U.S. Treasury debt held by the public is held by domestic and foreign holders, and private and official 
holders: 
 
(1) TTOT =  TD  +  TF 
 
  =  ( TD,P  +  TD,O )  +  ( TF,P  +  TF,O ) 
 
where TTOT is the total supply of Treasury debt held by the public, and for the other variables, the first 
subscript represents domestic (D) or foreign (F), and the second subscript represents private (P) or official 
(O).5 
   
Historical data show growing U.S. Treasury debt held by the public (TTOT) and growing foreign official 
(TF,O) holdings and shares for U.S. Treasury securities outstanding – and especially for the recent period 
associated with and following the recession and financial crisis (see Chart 1).  Particularly noteworthy is 
the large and growing role for foreign official holdings, rising from just over $600 billion (17 percent of 
total Treasury debt securities outstanding) at the end of 1999 to about $2.8 trillion (36 percent of  total 
outstanding) by the end of 2009.  Domestic official (TD,O) amounts in (1) above are those held by the 
Federal Reserve, which over the past two-and-a-half decades, generally have accounted for about 10 to 15 
percent of total outstanding Treasuries (and also generally in the range of about 4 percent to 6 percent of 
GDP).  During the financial crisis, however, the Federal Reserve share fell sharply (to as low as 7 percent 
of Treasuries outstanding) as the Federal Reserve used its portfolio of Treasury securities as part of its 
implementation of the various lending facilities, and reflecting its portfolio shift (and expansion) to other 
                                                 
4 The estimates and projections of this analysis were made prior to the July 2010 annual revision of the NIPAs. 
5 Treasury debt held by the public is the net debt and does not include the amounts owed within the U.S. government 
across accounts (e.g., social security and other trust fund accounts) that are included in measures of the “gross” debt. 
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assets (including government sponsored enterprise (GSE) debt securities).  More recently, the Federal 
Reserve’s share of Treasuries has increased back to around 10 percent of the total outstanding. 
 
3.2.  GSEs, Fannie and Freddie, and the Fed’s large-scale asset purchase program 
 
Following the decline in housing and mortgage markets and the ensuing financial crisis, much attention 
has been directed at U.S agency and GSE debt and securities – notably for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Mortgage Guarantee Corporation (Freddie Mac).  Chart 2 
shows historical data for agency, GSE, and GSE-backed securities by holder.6   During the financial 
crisis, the U.S. government undertook direct actions to provide backing for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
including direct purchases of GSE-backed debt.  As described in OMB’s Analytical Perspectives, 
Treasury acted to acquire GSE securities under temporary authority provided by the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008: 
 
Treasury initiated a temporary program to purchase MBS [mortgage-backed securities] 
issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which carry the GSEs’ standard guarantee 
against default. … Treasury purchased $226 billion in MBS from September 2008 to 
December 31, 2009, when the statutory authority for this program expired.  In addition, 
the Federal Reserve engaged in GSE MBS purchases over this period totaling $1 trillion 
through the end of 2009.  (OMB (2010), p. 350)   
 
The Federal Reserve’s purchases and holdings of agency and GSE-backed securities – through its balance 
sheet expansion and purchase of mortgage-backed securities – has attracted much attention because of the 
more-than-doubling of the Fed's balance sheet (and, hence, the monetary base) since the end of 2007, with 
much of that increase held in GSE-backed debt securities.  In early 2009 the Federal Reserve 
implemented a plan to expand credit and support aggregate demand through purchases of longer-term 
assets – described by Kohn (2009) as the large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) program.  The Fed increased 
purchases of GSE and agency debt, mortgage-backed securities, and longer-term U.S. Treasury securities.  
FOMC statements announced that the program would include purchases of up to $200 billion of agency 
debt, up to $300 billion in longer-term U.S. Treasury securities, and up to $1.25 trillion in agency 
mortgage-backed securities. 7 
                                                 
6 Beyond Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the total amounts in Chart 2 include the Federal Home Loan Banks and 
other agencies. 
7 At the end of 2009, agency and GSE-backed securities accounted for about 50 percent of the total assets on the 
Federal Reserve balance sheet, and Treasury securities accounted for about 30 percent. (See the H.4.1 release of the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors.) 
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The data show the U.S. government role – although substantial in absolute dollar amounts and as a share 
of the Fed’s balance sheet – has been a relatively small fraction of the total agency and GSE debt (Chart 
2).  Also, the portfolio changes have been effectively, on net, domestic in nature with private domestic 
holdings declining with the increase in Treasury and Fed holdings.  How the Federal Reserve and 
Treasury unwind their GSE positions will be an important policy issue going forward – especially for 
monetary policy interactions.  Nonetheless, the large increase in borrowing for housing that fueled the 
prior excessive increase in GSE debt securities is a thing of the past. 
 
For the analysis of this paper, benign assumptions are made in the base projections regarding Federal 
Reserve holdings of GSE securities and Federal budget exposure, as well as foreign portfolio holdings of 
GSE and other U.S. government agency debt.  The intent of the analysis is not to focus on the cyclical and 
short-run transitions that will occur, but rather on the implications at the intermediate-run horizon (i.e., 5 
to 10 years) when the economy has returned to its long-run trend or potential performance – as in the 
underlying economic assumptions.  As such, the analysis for the base case has an implicit assumption that 
Federal Reserve policy will gradually and successfully unwind its portfolio holdings of GSE securities 
and return to its pre-crisis position of a balance sheet comprised primarily of Treasury securities, and at a 
level consistent with the sustained growth and low inflation of the economic projections.  Analogously, 
foreign portfolio holdings of GSE and agency securities are assumed in the base projection to be 
consistent with the gradual unwinding and trend economic projections.  Hence, the analysis reflects 
general funding and portfolio pressures and not specific pressures associated with speculative scenarios 
regarding GSE securities.8  Regarding the Federal budget exposure, the CBO’s treatment of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac as government entities in its budget accounting and estimates explicitly includes the net 
expected Federal budget exposure by including “a subsidy equal to the shortfall between the current value 
of the mortgages and the liabilities used to fund them” (CBO (2010(b)).  Although CBO estimates in 
                                                 
8 This approach is consistent with CBO baseline assumptions (CBO 2010(a)), p. 91) and the information presented 
in the minutes of the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2010)), 
as in the following excerpts: 
“… Committee participants had expressed support for steps to reduce the size of the Federal  Reserve’s 
balance sheet over time and return the composition of the SOMA to only Treasury securities. … Meeting 
participants agreed broadly on key objectives of a longer-run strategy for asset sales and redemptions.  The 
strategy should be consistent with the achievement of the Committee’s objectives of maximum 
employment and price stability.  In addition, the strategy should normalize the size and composition of the 
balance sheet over time. Reducing the size of the balance sheet would decrease the associated reserve 
balances to amounts consistent with more normal operations of money markets and monetary policy. 
Returning the portfolio to its historical composition of essentially all Treasury securities would minimize 
the extent to which the Federal Reserve portfolio might be affecting the allocation of credit among private 
borrowers and sectors of the economy. … sales of agency debt and MBS should be implemented in 
accordance with a framework communicated in advance and be conducted at a gradual pace that potentially 
could be adjusted in response to changes in economic and financial conditions.” 
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2009 included the implicit subsidy cost of the existing business as well as new business, the budget 
estimates for 2010 did not include the subsidy for prior/existing business in the deficit and debt 
projections.  The analysis presented here proceeds using the baseline CBO projections, albeit a fuller 
accounting of the implied exposure to Fannie and Freddie could potentially suggest an expected debt 
effect of perhaps another couple hundred billion dollars in addition to that used here. 
 
3.3.  The base case and CBO projections 
 
The base case of this paper uses CBO’s baseline economic assumptions (CBO 2010(a)) and budget and 
debt projections from CBO's estimates of the President's Budget, (CBO (2010(c)).  The CBO economic 
projections assume the U.S. economy will rebound from the recession and return over several years to its 
potential growth path.  Output and unemployment gaps are expected to steadily decline and interest rates 
and inflation rates are assumed to reflect the return to an environment of sustained real growth at potential 
with low inflation.  The budget projections used in the analysis reflect the CBO’s baseline budget outlook 
adjusted to include the President’s policy proposals.  Although various alternative policy and budget 
outlooks are possible, the use of the CBO’s projections for the President’s budget policies provides a 
benchmark that generally incorporates policies that should be included in a true baseline policy outlook, 
including key tax provisions that are set to expire but that have broad political support for extension.9 
 
Regarding the international economic outlook, both the Administration and the CBO – based on language 
in their outlook discussions – implicitly have an improving net export outlook in their economic 
assumptions.  For example, for the Administration: 
 
As the U.S. economy recovers from the current crisis, it is unlikely to return to current 
account deficits as large as those in the mid-2000s. ... The specific path of the current  
account as the economy exits the crisis will depend on whether government and private 
saving rise ahead of, or along with, a rebound in private investment. But in the long run, 
                                                 
9 As this paper was being completed, CBO (2010(e)) released updated long-term budget projections including an 
alternative scenario that included policies – and resulting deficit and debt projections – similar to those of the 
President’s budget;  for example, debt held by the public was projected to rise to 87 percent of GDP in 2020 under 
the alternative scenario compared to 90 percent of GDP under the President’s budget estimates used in this analysis.    
In that report, CBO acknowledged some of the issues addressed in this paper:  “In fact, CBO’s projections 
understate the severity of the long-term budget problem because they do not incorporate the significant negative 
effects that accumulating substantial amounts of additional federal debt would have on the economy:  Large budget 
deficits would reduce national saving, leading to higher interest rates, more borrowing from abroad, and less 
domestic investment—which in turn would lower income growth in the United States.”  (CBO 2010(e), p. xi)  CBO 
also released a study (CBO (2010(f)) as this analysis was being completed with more discussion of the risk of fiscal 
crisis from higher Federal debt. 
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the current account deficit is likely to be smaller than it was before the crisis. ... Given 
that the current account deficit has already narrowed to roughly 3 percent of GDP—less 
than half its peak—the crucial challenge will be to avoid a reversion to a high-spending, 
low-saving economy.  A successful shift toward a more balanced world growth model 
generated by increased consumption in nations with current account surpluses could 
improve net exports even more.  This could bring the current account deficit toward its 
mid-1990s level of roughly 1 to 2 percent of U.S. GDP. (Council of Economic Advisers 
(2010), pp. 132-133) 
 
For the CBO, in addition to the outlook for improving U.S. trade balance, the outlook for a continued 
long-term downward trend for the value of the dollar is also described: 
 
CBO expects that net exports will increase next year as growth in foreign economies 
begins to outpace that in the United States and as the value of the dollar continues its 
long-term downward trend. (Congressional Budget Office, 2010(a), p. 34) 
 
Similarly, the average for the private Blue Chip forecasters' projections (Blue Chip Economic Indicators 
(2010)) of real net exports shows a slight downward trend over the 2012-2016 period with further small 
decline into the 2017-2021 period.  Such a projection would indicate a steady projected improvement in 
the U.S. trade balance as a percentage of GDP.  Hence, to reflect the general "consensus" among public 
and private forecasters, the base case projection includes a gradual trend improvement in U.S. net exports.  
 
The outlooks for U.S. government debt, interest rates, net exports, and other economic variables are all 
intertwined and the interactions are not always fully understood and accounted for.  Public and private 
forecasts generally do not have explicit information on assumptions about international holdings of U.S. 
Treasury securities, U.S. net international debt or net international income flows, or the portfolio 
allocations for international debt.  The analysis of this paper helps to illustrate the importance of 
recognizing and accounting for those relationships and effects. 
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4.  U.S. GOVERNMENT DEFICITS, FOREIGN OFFICIAL RESERVES AND INTEREST RATES 
 
It is commonplace to attribute effects of budget deficits and international financial flows on interest rates. 
Interestingly, however, the recent literature regarding the nature and magnitude of these effects in the era 
of large deficits and large flows is not particularly extensive, nor definitive.  This section presents an 
empirical specification and results for estimating the role of budget deficits and changes in foreign official 
holdings of Treasury securities in the determination of U.S. Treasury interest rates.  The estimated 
relationships are then used to analyze what the base case projections implicitly require for foreign official 
holdings of U.S. Treasuries. 
 
The estimated relationships presented here essentially describe how long-term Treasury rates adjust to 
induce private holdings of Treasuries – given the outlook for budget deficits and the behavior of official 
domestic and foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries.  The specification is also based on the assumption that 
the Federal Reserve implements monetary policy through open market operations on Treasury securities 
in order to set the short-term interest rate.  In line with the extant literature, we assume the Fed sets the 
target rate as a function of the output and inflation gaps, as described by Taylor (1993). 
   
4.1.  Empirical specification for U.S. Treasury rates 
 
The approach taken here draws from various studies in a growing literature.  Gale and Orszag (2002, 
2005) surveyed the literature on budget deficits and interest rates, primarily in a closed economy setting, 
and highlighted the significant role of Federal debt and budget deficits in determining long-term interest 
rates.  Kitchen (2003) presented a framework based on short-term interest rates being determined by a 
Taylor rule and with the structural Federal budget deficit determining the term spread for long-term 
Treasury interest rates relative to short-term rates.  Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2002) also observed a 
significant role for the Federal budget deficit for the long- to short-term spread for Treasury interest rates. 
The advent of the “conundrum” – that is surprisingly low long-term interest rates relative to short rates – 
inspired research introducing an international dimension.  Warnock and Warnock (2006) and Chinn and 
Frankel (2007) augmented conventional bond pricing specifications with international variables, namely 
foreign official purchases of U.S. Treasuries.  More recently, Laubach (2009) examined the response of 
long-horizon forward rates to increases in the projected deficit- and debt-to-GDP ratios. 
 
The specification employed here is based on that presented in Kitchen (2003), augmented to include the 
role of foreign official reserves as highlighted in Warnock and Warnock (2006) and Chinn and 
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Frankel(2007).  Kitchen (2003) derived an equation of the following quasi-reduced form for the term 
structure spread between the long- and short-term Treasury interest rates:  
 
tttttjtkt yyii εσφππγ ++−−−−=− )()()2( ,,  
 
where it,j is the nominal interest rate on a j-period Treasury security in period t, πt  is the inflation rate, yt 
is a (log) measure of aggregate output, and the “bar” variables represent the target or full employment 
levels of the corresponding variables.  The term premium σt is assumed to be comprised of (1) a liquidity 
premium and (2) a risk premium associated with uncertainty about interest rates generally, as well as 
uncertainty about the structural Federal budget deficit, specifically.  For the purposes of this paper, the 
role of foreign official holdings of Treasury securities is also included in affecting the term premium, 
affecting the relative demand-supply relationship over time, and thereby the market price and yield for 
Treasury securities.  The working assumption underlying equation (2) is that short-term interest rates are 
determined by the monetary policy rule; external changes in relative supply and demand for longer-term 
Treasury securities would therefore show up across the term structure beyond the short-term interest rate.  
We focus  on the yield for 10-year Treasury securities, but observed effects occur in shorter-term regions 
of the term structure as well.10  The role of increased Fed holdings of U.S. longer-term Treasuries as part 
of the large scale asset purchases (LSAP) program is also included in the estimation.11   
 
The empirical specifications used in regression analysis are based on: 
 
(3)  SPREADt  =  β0  +  β1 UNGAPt  +  β2 INFLt  +  β3 STRSURPt  +  β4 FOROFFICIALt  +  β5 FEDLT +  et 
 
where SPREAD is the term spread for longer-term Treasury yields relative to short-term Treasury rates 
(the 10-year yield minus the 3-month Treasury bill rate); UNGAP is the deviation of the unemployment 
                                                 
10 The estimation used is an approach that implicitly includes the well-known relationship of the term spread as a 
signal of economic activity across the business cycle – including as a key measure for recession probability 
estimation (e.g., Stock and Watson (2003), Wright (2006), among many others) – combined with information on key 
factors that affect the outlook, risk, and relative supply and demand for longer-term Treasury securities beyond the 
business cycle relationships for real activity and inflation.  The structural budget deficit is a supply shifter for 
longer-term Treasuries; foreign official holdings a demand shifter.  The relationships presented in this analysis 
therefore provide information for why the term spread isn't always a clear predictor for subsequent economic 
activity. 
11 Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2010) find evidence that the LSAP reduced U.S. long-term yields during its 
implementation. 
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rate from the natural rate (as estimated by the CBO)12; INFL is the difference between the inflation rate 
(the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditure price index of the NIPAs) and targeted 
inflation (here assumed at 1.8 percent)13; STRSURP is the structural, or cyclically-adjusted budget 
surplus/deficit as a percent of potential GDP (as estimated by the CBO); FOROFFICIAL is the change in 
foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities as a percent of potential GDP; and FEDLT is the 
change in Fed holdings of long-term (more than 5 years) Treasuries as a percent of potential GDP. 
 
Chart 3 shows foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities as a share of total outstanding 
Treasury securities; Chart 4 shows foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities as a percent of 
U.S. potential GDP.  Both charts show the rising importance of foreign official holdings.  The variable 
used in the empirical analysis – the change in foreign official holdings of Treasuries expressed as a 
percent of potential GDP – is similar to that used in Warnock and Warnock (2006).14 
 
The coefficient on the UNGAP variable, β1, is expected to be positive, and the coefficient on the 
INFLDEV variable, β2, is expected to be negative, reflecting their roles in the monetary policy rule and 
the resulting relationship to short-term rates.15  That is, with well-anchored long-run expected inflation, as 
output rises relative to potential, and unemployment falls relative to the NAIRU, the Federal Reserve 
would raise the short-term interest rate relative to the long-term interest rate and the term spread would 
decline.  Similarly, as inflation increased relative to the target level of inflation, the Federal Reserve 
would raise the short-term interest rate relative to the long-term rate and the term spread would decline.  
The coefficient on the structural surplus variable, β3, is hypothesized to be negative; an increase in the 
structural budget surplus (a fall in the deficit) would reduce the relative supply of Treasury securities and 
reduce risk and uncertainty for longer-term Treasury securities, leading to a lower long-term yield relative 
to short-term (short-run-policy-determined) rates.  The coefficient on the change in foreign official 
holdings of U.S. Treasuries is posited to be negative; an increase in foreign official holdings is interpreted 
to be an exogenous demand shift that would keep longer-term yields lower than otherwise. 
                                                 
12 The unemployment gap and the output gap are roughly interchangeable measures (a là Okun's law) of the relative 
cyclical position of the economy, the relative slack that exists in the economy. 
13 The rate of inflation as measured by the PCE price index tends to be several tenths of a percentage point lower 
than the CPI inflation rate; the 1.8 percent target rate use here is hence roughly equivalent to a CPI inflation rate of 
around 2 percent or just over. 
14 This specification based on the variables expressed relative to potential GDP follows that for the structural budget 
deficit being expressed as a percentage of potential GDP.  The data for foreign official holdings of Treasuries is 
taken from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds accounts; the data for the structural budget deficit is from CBO 
(2010(d)).  Warnock and Warnock (2006) used a specially constructed variable for foreign official flows. 
15 Note that the specification doesn't "require" and is not based on any specific values for policy coefficients on the 
gap and inflation variables, only that the policy rule in practice would adjust short-term rates in accordance with the 
expected direction. 
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4.2.  Estimation results 
 
Estimation of specifications from equation (3) above were conducted using annual data, reflecting the fact 
that key variables – budget projections and the international asset position – are only available at that 
frequency.16  The regression results are reported in Table 1; they confirm the hypothesized relationships 
included in equations (2) and (3) above.  The results in lines 1 through 3 build to the full specification.  
Line 1 shows the results using the variables affecting short-term policy (UNGAP and INFL) and the 
structural budget surplus as a percent of potential GDP (STRSURP).   Line 2 includes the variable for the 
change in foreign official holdings of Treasuries as a percent of potential GDP (FOROFFICIAL). Note 
that while a large proportion of the variation in the spread is explained by the specification reported in 
line 1, the serial correlation indicated by the Durbin-Watson statistic suggests that important factors are 
omitted.  This buttresses the economic motivation for re-examining the basic specification.  
 
The results in lines 2 and 3 generally conform to the hypothesized relationships for the specification, 
reflecting the policy relationships underlying the determination of short-term rates and confirming the 
importance of the structural budget deficit and the change in foreign official holdings as determinants of 
the long- to short-term Treasury yield spread.  The results in line 3 show a significant negative coefficient 
for the FEDLT variable, conforming to the view that the Fed’s purchases of longer-term Treasury 
securities as part of the LSAP program lowered long-term yields and relative to short-term rates.  The 
FEDLT variable – the change in Fed holdings of Treasury securities with more than 5 years to maturity as 
a percent of potential GDP – had a value of about 0.45 percentage point for 2009, so the coefficient value 
of -3.1 indicates that the estimated impact on the term premium is approximately 140 basis points for that 
year.  This estimate is larger than that obtained by Gagnon, et al. (2009), who estimated that the effect of 
the LSAP was in the range of 38 to 82 basis points (although a 95% confidence interval easily 
encompasses the upper end of Gagnon et al.’s estimates).  Further, Gagnon, et al.’s (2009) specification 
included all asset purchases, including GSE securities, as the relevant debt change measure.17   
 
The coefficient on FOROFFICAL is not statistically significant in line 3.  A high degree of 
multicollinearity between STRSURP, FOROFFICAL, and FEDLT variables is likely the cause, with 
correlations in the 0.54 to 0.75 range.  Since it is reasonable to expect that exogenous relative supply and 
                                                 
16 Quarterly data are available for historical data used in the specification (including recent CBO data for a NIPA-
equivalent quarterly cyclically-adjusted budget deficit); estimations were also performed on a quarterly basis and 
results were observed generally consistent with those using annual data.  We use fiscal year consistent data. 
17 It is possible that the LSAP variable in our regression estimates serves as a proxy for other unidentified variables 
or effects that could boost its estimated coefficient – for example,  a safe haven effect (discussed further below).  
Our primary focus here is on the estimated effects for the structural surplus and the foreign official holdings terms. 
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demand effects in the Treasury market have identical effects on interest rates, we chose to impose and test 
the restriction of equal coefficients on STRSURP and FOROFFICIAL.  The estimates of the resulting 
specification are reported in line 4 of Table 1.  Our conjecture is borne out by the results; an F test for 
testing the restriction of equality of the coefficients shows that equality cannot be rejected. 
   
The results in the estimated equation of line 4 generally conform to prior estimates in the literature for the 
effects of the budget deficit on long-term Treasury yields – and for the effect of the change in foreign 
official holdings, as well.  The estimated effect is 27 basis points on the 10-year yield relative to the short-
term yield for each one percentage point of GDP for the structural budget deficit – a result that lines up 
relatively closely with the estimates from Gale and Orszag (2002, 2005) at 25 to 35 basis points and 
Laubach (2009) at 20 to 30 basis points.  Also, as observed in Warnock and Warnock (2006) and in Chinn 
and Frankel (2007), the results confirm the importance of foreign official holdings of Treasuries as a 
determinant of the long-term Treasury yield (here expressed relative to the short-term yield).  Warnock 
and Warnock, for example, showed estimated effects for the budget deficit (relative to GDP) of 19 to 31 
basis points and for foreign official flows (measured relative to GDP) of 24 to 61 basis points; Chinn and 
Frankel (2007) observe estimates in the range of 52 to 71 basis points (for real and nominal Treasury 
rates, and for a sample extending to September 2004).18  The summary regression statistics for the line 4 
equation are also generally good, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.673, a Durbin-Watson of 1.96, and a 
standard error of the regression of about 0.7 percentage point.  Throughout the Table 1 results, the 
declining Akaike information criterion values verify the use of the additional variables in each line and 
the restriction imposed in line 4.  Testing for heteroskedasticity produced test statistics that did not reject 
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity for the line 4 equation.  Chart 5 shows the actual 10-year to 3-
month Treasury spread compared to the fitted values from the full specification in line 4 of Table 1.19 
The results presented here are consistent with short-term rates being determined according to a Taylor 
rule with budget deficits boosting long-term yields.  The results also conform to a view that foreign 
official flows from abroad kept long-term rates lower than otherwise, contributing to an environment in 
which financial flows and interest rates exacerbated the housing and financial boom and bust.20 
                                                 
18 Because of estimation and specification differences, the coefficient estimates are not all directly comparable, but 
nonetheless give references for relative magnitudes. 
19 Note that no explicit “safe haven” demand for Treasuries is identified in the empirical specification.  As more data 
become available, such a relationship may become clearer for describing Treasury interest rate behavior over recent 
periods.  At this time, using annual data, the relationship would effectively be a one-period observation.  Although 
safe haven effects could keep borrowing costs lower during short-run periods, the intent of this analysis and the 
projections presented ultimately is not on short-run temporary relationships, but rather on persisting general 
relationships and pressures underlying relative supply and demand effects – domestic and foreign – for Treasuries. 
20 These observations are similar to those of Greenspan (2009) regarding foreign financial flows and of Bernanke 
(2005) regarding a global saving glut, with the observed relationship here pointing to the (foreign) policy-
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determined flows via foreign official holdings.  Warnock and Warnock (2006) also discuss this observation.  
Bergsten (2009) stated:  “… the crisis occurred at least partly because the rest of the world was too willing to 
finance US current account deficits rather than becoming unwilling to do so.” 
C UNGAP INFL STRSURP FOROFFICIAL FEDLT Adj. R2 DW SE AIC F
1     1.375**      0.516**    ‐0.314**  ‐0.206* 0.585 1.48 0.785 2.48
(0.264) (0.151) (0.071) (0.102)
2     1.434**      0.561**    ‐0.405**    ‐0.292**   ‐0.398*  0.612 1.83 0.760 2.43
(0.257) (0.148) (0.087) (0.111) (0.234)
3      1.517**      0.599**    ‐0.428**    ‐0.270** ‐0.203   ‐3.307** 0.661 1.92 0.709 2.32
(0.243) (0.140) (0.082) (0.104) (0.236) (1.509) 
4      1.544**      0.614**    ‐0.439**   ‐3.128** 0.673 1.96 0.697 2.26 0.53
(0.224) (0.128) (0.073) (1.375) 
Standard errors in parentheses; ** denotes significant at the 0.05 level; * denotes significant at the 0.10 level.
DW is Durbin‐Watson statistic; SE is standard error of the regression.
AIC is the Akaike information criterion
F is the test value for the Wald test for the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients on STRSURP and FOROFFICIAL.
Ordinary Least Squares, Sample 1979‐2009
   ‐0.271**
(0.102)
Regression Results for the Treasury Interest Rate Term Spread, 10‐Year ‐ 3 Month
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5. IS THERE ENOUGH MONEY IN THE WORLD?  BASE PROJECTIONS AND IMPLIED INTERNATIONAL 
PORTFOLIO ADJUSTMENTS 
 
In this section, we examine the outlook for international debt and net income flows using historical rates 
of return and assumptions regarding portfolio allocations, in a manner consistent with relationships 
regarding the trajectory of rates of return and debt as described in Kitchen (2007).21  The exercise does 
not produce a forecast per se, but rather a projection that is consistent with other projections and 
assumptions.  In our base case, we rely upon the CBO’s economic and debt projections over the next 10 
years.  We project foreign holdings and the U.S. international investment position for the period up to 
2020, based on historical investment position data available through 2009 (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis(2010)).22 
 
5.1.  Interest rates and other assumptions in the base case outlook 
 
In constructing the base case (and to illustrate the implied role for foreign official holdings), the various 
components and assumptions were derived in a manner to be as consistent as possible with the CBO 
projections of the President’s budget from March 2010.  CBO’s economic assumptions have the output-
unemployment gaps closing to zero over several years and inflation settles at a targeted level (around 2 
percent depending on the inflation measure used).  In CBO budget projections, the structural budget 
deficit initially falls from recent highs but then begins to gradually rise relative to GDP through the end of 
the 10-year projection; by 2020 the structural budget deficit approaches 6 percent of GDP.23  Those 
budget assumptions yield the outlook in the CBO projections for the debt held by the public, which under 
the estimates for the President’s budget, rises to 90 percent of GDP.  In the base case of this analysis, 
foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities are determined – based on the empirical estimates 
above – so as to yield the CBO interest rate assumptions.  CBO’s projections of long-term Treasury yield 
projections are similar to those of the Administration and the Blue Chip consensus forecast, so our results 
are not being driven by any special characteristics of the CBO outlook.24 
 
                                                 
21 Kitchen (2007) provides a description of the model used; it has been maintained and updated to incorporate new 
data and minor methodological changes.  A separate appendix for the framework is available from the authors. 
22 Cline (2005, 2009) also addresses the implications of the U.S. fiscal outlook for the U.S. international debt 
position and international income flows, but without a full explicit accounting for the specific international and 
domestic sources for financing U.S. Treasury debt and the implications thereof. 
23 CBO (2010(d)) published the cyclically-adjusted deficit estimates for historical and initial projection years 
(through 2014); for subsequent years an estimated cyclical adjustment was determined from a regression for the 
historical values and the CBO estimated unemployment gap from NAIRU.  Also, adjustments were made to the 
baseline projections to account for the effects of CBO estimates of the President’s budget. 
24 Note that Cline (2009) observes that “the CBO long-term projection itself does not appear to increase the interest 
rate in response to the higher deficit … .”  Here, the derivation allows foreign official flows to provide the financing 
that keeps rates at the levels of the CBO assumptions.  
  19
Percent, annual
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
CBO, Jan 2010
  3-Month Treasury Bill 3.9 4.2 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.8
  10-Year Treasury Yield 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
      Spread 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8
Administration, Feb 2010
  3-Month Treasury Bill 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
  10-Year Treasury Yield 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
      Spread 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Blue Chip, March 2010
  3-Month Treasury Bill
  10-Year Treasury Yield
      Spread
Base Case Estimate/Fitted
  3-Month Treasury Bill (Taylor) 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
  10-Year Treasury Yield 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
      Spread 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Projections for Key Treasury Security Interest Rates
3.9
5.4
1.5
4.2
5.5
1.3
2012-2016 2017-2021
Table 2 shows the results for the projections for interest rates for the second half of the decade.  
Generally, similar results are observed for the Taylor rule-generated short-term rates compared to the 
public and private projections, with the Blue Chip, Administration, and base case estimates averaging at 
about 4.1.25  CBO’s short-term rate is on the high side at 4.8 percent.  Using the estimated relationships 
from the equation of line 3 in Table 1 and the base case budget assumptions for the structural budget 
deficit, the estimated term spread in the final line of Table 2 is produced by assuming the needed increase 
in foreign official holdings to approximately replicate the 10-year yield levels of the CBO and other 
projections.26  The increase in foreign official holdings required to produce the base case interest rates 
(given the rising structural budget deficit) is addressed further in the following discussion. 
 
5.2.  Portfolio allocations – historical data and base projections 
 
Table 3 shows the international portfolio allocations for U.S.-owned assets abroad and foreign-owned 
assets in the United States for selected years for a historical period and our assumptions for the base  
 
 
Table 2 
                                                 
25 The Taylor rule specification employed is based on the form identified in Taylor (1993), with a coefficients on the 
unemployment gap of 1.0 (twice as large as the 0.5 for the output gap via Okun’s law) and a coefficient on the 
inflation gap of 0.5; we use an equilibrium short-term real rate of 2.1 percent and a target CPI inflation rate of 2 
percent. 
26 The CBO’s assumed term spread appears abnormally low at less than one percentage point, yet the overall level of 
the CBO’s 10-year yield is similar to others’ because of the high short-term rate. 
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projection.  The portfolio shares used in the projections should be viewed as being representative of the 
changes that would have to occur in order to conform to the changes in foreign official holdings assumed 
or required to occur by case.  A fully-specified portfolio allocation model for international assets could 
potentially be a useful enrichment of the analysis provided here, but is beyond the scope of the present 
analysis and is an area for further research.27  In particular, a better understanding of the potential relative 
asset effects for "crowding out" in the international portfolio could be gained.28 
 
Of particular importance in the projections is the path of foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries relative to 
GDP that is required to be consistent with the interest rate projections of the base case economics – and 
the resulting portfolio shares of U.S. treasuries for foreign holdings of U.S. assets.  The derived large 
increase in the portfolio share for foreign official holdings of Treasuries – rising from 25 percent to 45 
percent – reveals the extent to which the projections for long-term Treasury interest rates remaining at 
around 5½ percent (as in private and public projections) in the face of a rising Federal structural budget 
deficit depend on an increase in foreign holdings.29   
 
The portfolio shares of the base projection also show the phenomenon of “crowding out” occurring in the 
portfolio allocations for international financial assets.  Historically, the concept of crowding out 
associated with budget deficits referred to the prospect of domestic investment being crowded out because 
of higher interest rates.  However, beginning with the large budget deficits of the mid-1980s, net exports 
were more likely to be crowded out.  Hence, the United States was able to continue to maintain private 
domestic investment and even continued positive net international investment income flows, even as the 
U.S. net international debt increased.  In the base case presented here, however, the implied portfolio 
shares reveal the pressures that will occur with the persistent need to fund U.S. budget deficits – 
increasing shares of assets held in U.S. Treasury securities, and decreasing shares held in direct foreign 
investment, corporate stocks and bonds, and in other assets.  Reduced foreign flows and holdings in 
private assets reveal the potential manifestation of crowding out in the foreign asset portfolio. 
                                                 
27 See, for example, Black and Litterman (1992) and He and Litterman (1999). 
28 Mann (2009, p. 48) discusses the challenges regarding understanding the determination of the portfolio allocations 
for foreign held assets:  “All told, from the standpoint of sustainability research relevant for projections, this body of 
analysis points out the challenges of projecting both the level and any change in the desire of foreigners to continue 
to buy US assets and the type of assets.” 
29 Note that the required increase in foreign holdings of Treasuries is directly dependent on the magnitude of the 
coefficient on foreign holdings as estimated and reported in Table 1.  If we were to use a larger estimated effect 
(such as observed by Chinn and Frankel (2007) or at the upper end of the Warnock and Warnock (2006), the 
required increase in foreign holdings for the base case would be accordingly smaller, and on a roughly proportional 
basis.  For example, an estimated coefficient at around -0.55 instead of the constrained -0.271 we used would 
require an increase in foreign holdings only about half as large as we have in the base case. 
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2001 2005 2009 2010 2011 2016 2020
US Owned Assets Abroad:
  Direct Investment 26.8 24.6 27.2 26.2 25.2 23.7 23.1
  Foreign Securities 34.4 40.2 36.8 38.2 38.9 40.1 40.1
    Bonds 8.8 9.4 10.0 10.4 10.2 10.3 10.3
    Corporate Stocks 25.6 30.8 26.8 27.9 28.8 29.8 29.8
  US claims, Nonbanks 13.3 9.5 5.3 5.6 5.8 6.5 6.7
  US claims, Banks 22.0 23.3 27.3 27.2 27.1 26.9 26.9
  Official 2.1 1.7 2.7 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.9
  Other US Govt 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
Foreign Owned Assets in the US:
  Direct Investment 18.6 14.9 15.1 14.9 14.7 13.5 12.9
  US Treasury Securities 4.6 5.0 4.7 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.2
  US Securities other than Treas 34.5 34.1 29.8 29.5 29.2 20.6 17.8
    Corporate and other bonds 16.4 17.6 16.0 15.9 15.7 11.4 10.0
    Corporate stocks 18.1 16.5 13.8 13.6 13.5 9.2 7.8
  US currency 2.8 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.4
  US liabilities, nonbanks 9.8 5.2 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.3 3.1
  US liabilities, banks 16.2 20.4 20.3 20.1 19.9 15.6 14.2
  Official 13.6 18.1 24.7 25.2 25.9 40.2 45.4
Source:  Historical data, Bureau of Economic Analysis; authors' projections
Projections/Assumptions
International Investment Asset Shares, Percent of Total
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
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5.3.  The international debt and income outlook under the base case – and other issues 
 
The overall U.S. net international debt position and the associated net international income flows derived 
under the base case are shown in Charts 6 and 7.   Under the base case, U.S. net international debt as a 
share of GDP nearly doubles over the 10-year projection period, increasing from about 20 percent of GDP 
to 38 percent.  Net international income flows turn negative and steadily decline, from roughly +1 percent 
of GDP in recent years to about -1.9 percent of GDP by the end of the ten-year projection.  That negative 
net international income flow represents a wedge between GDP and national income.  Note that, even 
with the assumption in the base case of a gradually improving U.S. net trade position over the projection, 
the current account deficit would gradually widen, reflecting the increasingly negative net international 
income flows.  
 
The increased foreign holdings of Treasury securities under the base case result in a substantial increase 
in interest payments to foreigners on Treasury debt as part of the net international income flow (see 
Charts 8 and 9).  Chart 9 shows that interest payments for Treasuries relative to GDP account for the bulk 
of the change in net international flows over the ten-year projection (shown in Chart 6), accounting for an 
increase of roughly 3 percent of GDP.  Charts 8 and 9 also highlight the interesting result that, initially, 
the payments to foreign holders of Treasuries are relatively low for several years – despite rising foreign 
holdings – as interest rates on Treasuries are projected to be abnormally low during the recession and 
early recovery period.  However, as interest rates rise to higher levels, interest payments to foreign 
holders of Treasuries rise sharply, in absolute terms, and relative to GDP.30  Chart 8 also shows that the 
increase in foreign holdings of Treasuries under the base case over the 2010-2020 projection – that is, the 
increase required to keep Treasury bond yields from rising higher than shown in the base economic 
assumptions (given the structural budget deficit projection) – amounts to the bulk of the $11 trillion 
increase in the base-case projection for publicly-held Treasury debt.31 
                                                 
30 These increases essentially show the combined effect from having the growing share of Treasuries in the foreign-
held asset portfolio (the share rising from 25 percent to 45 percent) and the increasing effective rate of return on 
those assets from just over 2 percent to around 5 percent. 
31 This result reflects the estimated relationships for the term spread and the equality of the estimated coefficients for 
the budget deficit effect and the foreign official holdings effect reported in Table 1 and used in the analysis. 
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Foreign Holdings of US Treasury Debt and US Government 
Payments to Foreigners for Treasuries (% of US GDP)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
Holdings of US Treasuries (Left Axis)
US Payments to Foreigners Treasuries (Right axis)
Percent of US GDP Percent of US GDP
Foreign Holdings of US Treasuries and U.S. Payments to 
Foreigners on Treasuries
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
Holdings of US Treasuries (Left axis)
Payments (Right axis)
$Trillions $Billions
Chart 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chart 9 
 
 
 
  25
5.4.  Further and fundamental challenges of the base case 
 
As discussed above, the base case projection generally follows private and public economic forecasts, and 
in particular regarding nominal GDP growth, interest rates and the U.S. net export outlook.  As such, the 
projection includes:  U.S. GDP growth rebounding out of the recession and then subsequently returning to 
potential; an improvement in the U.S. trade balance (with an associated gradual decline in the value of the 
dollar over time); and relatively benign longer-term interest rate levels. 32  Those results are assumed to 
occur with and despite rising structural budget deficits.33 
 
5.4.1.  Foreign official holdings and currency values?  One challenge concerns the relationships 
involved with foreign official holdings, currency values, and the net export outlook.  From the perspective 
of the balance of payments, and the recognition of the role of increasing foreign official assets in keeping 
exchange values of currencies low, a fundamental question emerges regarding whether such a large 
increase in foreign official assets – required to keep U.S. long-term interest rates relatively low – could 
also be associated with the improving net export deficit assumed by public and private forecasters and 
used in the base case.  The projections of the base case were derived implicitly and explicitly accounting 
for the effects on international flows and stocks accompanying the assumptions.  Hence, the required 
matching of trade and financial flows occurs.  But this is fundamentally different from what has occurred 
historically, with foreign official holdings accommodating currency valuations – and also in a manner that 
mirrored the U.S. net export deficit (see Chart 10).  Hence, the question exists whether the joint set of 
assumptions properly accounts for the trade-offs for foreign official holdings, managed currency 
valuations, and trade.  High foreign official holdings of Treasuries could keep Treasury yields low, but 
also could tend to be associated with relatively higher demand for the dollar and keeping the exchange 
value of foreign currencies low relative to the dollar.  That, in turn, could tend to promote continued U.S. 
trade imbalances – a result contrary to the underlying assumptions of the base case.  
 
5.4.2.  Negative impacts on GDP from international portfolio crowding out?  A second challenge 
regards whether the real GDP growth assumptions fully account for the adverse impacts on investment 
associated with the distorted financial flows and portfolio allocations of the base case.  With the extent of 
crowding out of private flows to private allocations in the international accounts in order to accommodate 
holdings of Treasury securities (see Table 3) – potential crowding out of investments in corporate equity 
                                                 
32 That is, benign on a historical comparison basis for the economy in a sustained expansion with relatively low 
inflation. 
33 Note that CBO (2010(c)) – in its description of the potential economic effects from the President’s budget – 
considered some aspects of the open vs. closed economy relationships and the role of international flows.  Much of 
that focus was on the behavior of private flows – a different perspective than the role of foreign official holdings. 
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and bonds, banking assets, and even foreign direct investment – does the real GDP growth and underlying 
investment assumed in the base case fully account for that?34  One way to avoid such crowding out would 
be for an overall higher flow of international financing – for trade and current account deficits to widen 
(as in the first challenge above) – but such an outcome is inconsistent with the assumptions of the base 
case, and would further perpetuate international imbalances that most observers view as unsustainable.   
 
5.4.3.  Is there enough money in the world … in the “global portfolio?”  A third challenge is whether 
the increase in foreign holdings of such magnitude as in the base case is plausible or even possible.  That 
is, reflecting the Meltzer quote earlier in the paper:  "Is there enough money in the world?"  Chart 11 
shows the implied effect from the base case on foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities as a 
percent of world GDP (in U.S. dollars).  The large increase in foreign official holdings implied by the 
base case would require those holdings to rise to about 19 percent of rest-of-world (ROW) GDP, up from 
less than 5 percent for most years of history.  Bertaut, Kamin and Thomas (2009) and Mann (2009) 
examine the issue of the U.S. asset share of the total world asset portfolio and the extent to which foreign 
investment in U.S. assets can increase under continued U.S. current account deficits and growth in the 
U.S. net international debt.  Mann observed a “financial leverage” for the “global investor portfolio” of 
1.6 times (160 percent) ROW GDP.  The implied change in foreign official holdings from about 7 percent 
of world GDP in 2009 to more than 18 percent of ROW GDP by 2020 could at first glance therefore 
represent a potentially manageable shift compared to the total (non-U.S.) world portfolio.  Mann showed 
that the share of U.S. assets held by foreigners in the world portfolio was about 14 percent in 2006, and 
that even with a doubling or tripling of that share (associated with projected U.S. current account 
imbalances), “these percentages would appear to imply US assets in the global investor’s portfolio about 
equal to the market cap weights.”  Although questions would remain about the implementation and 
allocations associated with increased foreign official holdings – including issues associated with private 
versus official portfolio allocations and competition for funds amongst various international borrowers in 
a time of higher debt – the relationships suggest at face value that “there would be enough money in the 
world” to meet the financing requirements for U.S. Treasuries over the intermediate horizon (through 
2020) and under the assumptions considered in this analysis.  Uncertainty remains, however, under such a 
projection whether world portfolio allocations would, in fact, adjust sufficiently to accommodate higher 
shares of U.S. assets.  Further, such an expansion has limits that ultimately could not be sustained 
indefinitely over the long run and beyond the intermediate horizon considered here. 35 
                                                 
34 Auerbach and Gale (2009) discuss concerns about negative effects on GDP growth and lower potential output. 
35 Similarly, Mann concluded that, in contrast to the implications from the average portfolio percentages, it “looks 
unreasonable” for the required marginal contributions per dollar of new investment that would have to occur for 
holdings of U.S. assets under those increased world portfolio shares.  
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6.  ALTERNATIVE CASES 
 
Although many different alternatives to the base case could be examined, two additional scenarios are 
presented to illustrate how the projections would be affected by alternative outlooks for (1) foreign 
official holdings and (2) sustained higher growth of Federal Reserve holdings (i.e., the domestic monetary 
base).  Table 4 presents information on key assumptions and relationships in the scenarios.36   
 
6.1.  Alternative 1: Foreign official holdings at maintained percent of U.S. GDP – higher U.S. 
interest rates … 
 
If foreign official holdings were not to increase relative to the size of the U.S. economy over the 
projection period, and were only to grow with the growth in the U.S. economy, long-term Treasury 
security interest rates would be higher than under the base case.  Under such a scenario, foreign official 
holdings, while fixed as a percent of U.S. GDP, would have a substantially lower portfolio share of total 
foreign assets – about 14 percent by 2020 compared to the base case of about 45 percent. 
 
Using the estimated relationships from Section 4.1, point estimates show the 10-year Treasury yield 
would rise relative to the 5.2 percent to 5.6 percent of the base case for 2015-2020 to about 6.7 percent in 
2015 and to 7.1 percent by 2020.37  These estimates reflect the role of the rising structural budget deficit 
of the base case without the offset from foreign official flows – as well as the endogenous feedback to the 
structural deficit from higher debt service costs.  Estimates of the resulting effect of the higher longer-
term Treasury yields on the debt service costs for the budget indicate an increase by about $75 billion in 
2016 and about $120 billion by 2020, with a cumulative effect on the debt of about $670 billion – about 3 
percent of GDP – by 2020.38 
                                                 
36 The alternative cases considered here are not derived in fully-specified general equilibrium models that would 
account for all of the interactions and changes to the associated underlying economic variables.  As such, the 
scenarios do not represent the complete spectrum of effects or the behavioral and second-order relationships that 
would occur.  The scenarios are intended to be illustrative of the changes and pressures that would occur and not full 
model outcomes or forecasts. 
37 As this analysis was being completed, the IMF (2010) released a report examining special issues for the United 
States, with a section that addressed “The Financing of U.S. Federal Budget Deficits.”  That analysis used rules of 
thumb reflecting the results of Laubach (2009) – and similar to those estimated here – to examine the potential effect 
from higher U.S. debt on borrowing costs, with results suggesting an increase of 50 to 150 basis points.  That range 
encompasses the estimated effects presented in this paper.  The analysis of this paper explicitly estimates and 
addresses the relationships and roles for alternative sources of financing – in particular foreign official vs. private – 
and how those relative allocations would affect long-term Treasury rates. 
38 These estimates were made in a small model for debt service budget effects from higher interest rates (a notable 
assumption used was that new debt issuance was assumed to keep the relative maturity structure stable).  The model 
was tested to successfully replicate the CBO’s estimates presented in CBO (2010(a)) in Appendix Table C.1.  Note 
that the estimates presented in the text are not for an equivalent shift of interest rates across the term structure (as in 
the CBO tabular estimates), but rather for an increase in intermediate- and longer-term rates relative to the short-
term rate. 
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6.2.  Alternative 2: Faster sustained growth of Federal Reserve holdings of U.S. Treasuries – higher 
inflation, interest rates, and lower exchange value of the dollar … 
 
The final scenario presented here considers the general effects from sustained higher growth of Federal 
Reserve holdings of Treasuries – an illustration of a partial “monetization of the debt.”39  The scenario is 
based on examining the general pressures that would arise from faster sustained growth of Federal 
holdings of U.S. Treasury securities, and the implications for inflation, interest rates, and the international 
position and flows as examined in the other scenarios of this analysis.  It uses standard restrictive 
“monetarist” relationships that illustrate the long-run pressures that would be exerted on key variables.  
Under those assumptions, a sustained increase in the rate of growth of Federal Reserve holdings of 
Treasuries (increase in monetary base growth) by one percent per year relative to the base case passes 
through one-for-one to the money supply, and one-for-one to inflation being higher by one percent per 
year.  In turn, the higher inflation rate passes through to nominal interest rates being higher by one 
percentage point, and the exchange value of the dollar declines by an additional one percent per year 
relative to the base case, maintaining relative parity relationships.  For purposes of the monetary policy 
rule, the target inflation rate also increases by one percent.  We assume no change to the projection for 
real GDP growth, and no change in net exports as the changes in prices and the exchange value of the 
dollar lead to no change in real prices for exports and imports.  Reflecting the higher rate of inflation, 
nominal GDP growth is one percentage point higher per year.  Although short-run dynamics and 
transitions could be very different from these assumptions, the restrictive assumptions meet the intent of 
the projections being to examine the general implications and pressures from indefinitely sustained higher 
growth of Fed Treasury holdings.  Foreign official holdings of Treasuries are assumed to continue at the 
base scenario percentages of GDP – in order to maintain the same Treasury yield term spread of the base 
case; the only change to nominal interest rates is the one percentage point increase to the nominal yield at 
all terms associated with the increase in the inflation rate of one percentage point.   
 
CBO (2010(a)) published the estimated effects on the budget from changes in economic assumptions; 
here the budget effects of a one percentage point increase in the inflation rate are used, a cumulative 
effect through 2020 of $728 billion.40  The budget effect from higher inflation is small relative to the 
increase in nominal GDP; the debt-to-GDP ratio is lower in 2020, at 84 percent of GDP under the 
alternative scenario, compared to 90 percent in the base case.  The debt-to-GDP ratio is often viewed as 
                                                 
39 Some analysts and researchers view monetization of the debt as an option for reducing the “burden” from high 
government debt levels.  See, for example, Aizenman and Marion (2009); and Mankiw (2009), who stated:   “A little 
more inflation might be preferable to rising unemployment or a series of fiscal measures that pile on debt 
bequeathed to future generations.” 
40 Higher inflation results in higher spending – for discretionary programs, indexed mandatory spending, and higher 
interest costs – with the spending increases only partly offset by rising nominal receipts. 
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the metric by which the debt burden is measured (see, for example, Aizenman and Marion (2009)), 
focusing on the value of the stock of debt relative to the production flow in the United States.  With the 
large share of foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury debt, and with ongoing U.S. deficits and debt turnover to 
be financed, it is important to also recognize the role of payments to foreign holders of U.S. Treasuries 
and the impact on domestic national income relative to production.  In the alternative scenario being 
addressed here of higher inflation and interest rates, the continued high foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury 
debt combined with higher nominal interest rates result in higher payments to foreign holders of U.S. 
Treasury debt than under the base case – and higher relative to GDP (4.2 percent of GDP in the 
alternative compared to 3.7 percent in the base case).  Overall net international income flows are more 
negative – at -2.2 percent of GDP in the alternative scenario compared to the -1.9 percent of the base case 
– so the notion of “improvement” in the debt burden is slightly mitigated when accounting for the income 
flows.  Note also, that because of the higher U.S. nominal GDP and the greater decline in the value of the 
dollar in this alternative scenario, the U.S. net international debt position relative to GDP is lower at about 
31 percent of GDP in 2020 compared to the 38 percent of the base case.  The results show that higher 
inflation would reduce the relative stocks of government debt and net international debt measured relative 
to GDP, but with the potential for higher net international income payments abroad and the resulting 
lower national income relative to GDP. 
   
7.  CLOSING DISCUSSION 
 
The analysis and results presented in this paper confirm the fundamental challenges associated with 
funding U.S. deficits and debt, with a specific recognition of the role of – and interactions with – 
international financial assets and flows.  We reiterate that the results and scenarios presented in this paper 
are not “forecasts” per se, but rather projections that illustrate some fundamental relationships for the U.S. 
fiscal outlook in an international setting, and specifically the role of international financial flows and 
portfolio adjustments; also, the analysis focuses on the intermediate-horizon outlook and does not directly 
address issues or questions associated with varying views of short-run policy or cyclical behavior.  The 
base case and alternative scenarios are descriptive of the relationships involved regarding alternative 
assumptions about foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities for financing U.S. debt.  New 
empirical evidence was presented that explicitly accounted for the roles of U.S. structural budget deficits 
and foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasuries in determining Treasury security interest rates, with the 
empirical results being used to examine the implications of changing relative magnitudes of foreign 
official holdings for Treasury interest rates.  Two alternative scenarios considered (1) how the projected 
outlook would be affected if foreign official holdings of Treasuries did not increase substantially as 
assumed in the base case, and (2) the effects on the projections from assuming the Federal Reserve (Fed) 
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would increase the rate of growth for its holdings of U.S. Treasury securities, i.e., a partial monetization 
of the debt. 
 
The results from the cases examined highlight several specific challenges and potential tradeoffs.  The 
results indicate that current private and public economic forecasts (and as used in our base case) implicitly 
require that foreign official holdings continually increase – and by large amounts – to fund continued 
deficits and to keep interest rates as low as assumed in those forecasts.  Yet, historically, large increases 
in foreign official holdings have tended to be associated with management of currency values and 
ongoing U.S. trade deficits.  Those relationships pose a potential problem for assuming both relatively 
low interest rates and ongoing improvement in the U.S. trade deficit with, at the same time, continued 
budget deficits and growing debt.  Further, if the share of foreign financial flows devoted to U.S. 
Treasuries increases, then the potential exists for “crowding out” of foreign flows that have historically 
been a key source for funding domestic investment.  The question arises, then, as to how domestic 
investment and potential output growth would be affected.  Finally, although the general interpretation 
presented here and by other researchers is that the world portfolio could potentially accommodate the 
“required” increase in foreign funding of U.S. Treasury securities, it remains an open question whether 
such an increase would be forthcoming.  Ultimately, measures that reduce the deficit by changing the 
trajectory of tax revenues and spending, particularly in the latter years of the horizon we consider and 
beyond, would mitigate the concerns about the financing of the U.S. budget and current account deficits. 
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